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Reports about the decision of the United States to set up a border force with the so-called “Sy-
rian Democratic Forces” (SDF) that would opera-
te along the Turkish and Iraqi borders and also 
inside Syria along the Euphrates river, exacerba-
ted the tension in the already strenuous relations 
between Ankara and Washington. Turkey regards 
the SDF that is dominated by the Kurdish YPG 
as indistinguishable from the PKK terrorist orga-
nization. Accordingly, this move of Washington is 
seen from Ankara’s perspective as adding insult 
to injury and as a clear sign that the United States 
will not keep its promise to dump the YPG once 
the war against ISIS is won. 
Turkey’s concomitant military mobilization along 
the Syrian border and the statements made by 
President Recep T. Erdoğan hinting at a large-
scale military operation towards the sectors in 
northern Syria where the YPG aims to expand its 
authority may well result in unwanted and, certa-
inly, an undesired confrontation between Turkey 
and the United States. So, how did Turkey and the 
United States, which have long treated each other 
as a “staunch ally” during the Cold War period, 
come to the point of wrangling and why do they 
seem to be drifting further apart from each other 
day by day? 
The answer lies in the developments that have 
taken place since the end of the East-West conf-
rontation that heralded the beginning of a new era 
in Turkish-American relations due to the changing 
priorities of the long-time allies, which manifested 
themselves in their policies toward Iraq following 
the 1991 Gulf War. The divergence of approac-
hes toward the future of the Middle East in gene-
ral and Iraq in particular in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks aggravated the tension in 
the bilateral relations. Had it not been for the sake 
of having a history together, “rivalry” would be the 
term to define the nature of the state of affairs in 
Turkish-American relations since then.
The above paragraph is borrowed from the abs-
tract of an article, entitled “Turkey and the Uni-
ted States in the 21st Century: Friends or Foes?” 
that was published in the Winter 2008 issue of the 
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, which I had 
co-authored with my colleague Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu. 
In that article, Dr. Oğuzlu and I had discussed the 
sources of policies that were bringing Turkey and 
the United States to the brink of wrangling in a 
number of issue areas in the fields of foreign and 
security policies, and argued that a lack of com-
mon security culture was primarily responsible for 
most of the trouble encountered in the bilateral 
relations.  
Ten years later, even a brief look at the current 
state of affairs in Turkish-American relations sug-
gests that bilateral relations have been deteriora-
ting since then, let alone marking any notable ac-
hievement. Therefore, a meaningful assessment 
of the current situation in Turkish-American relati-
ons requires a sound analysis of how and why, at 
times of dramatic changes in world politics, both 
countries have not been able to adjust their fore-
ign and security policies.
The “Kurdish Issue” as a Dividing Factor in 
Turkish-American Relations 
The fractures that are being experienced lately in 
Turkish-American relations, such as the short-li-
ved suspension of visa applications to the US dip-
lomatic missions in Turkey, or the so-called “Zar-
rab court case” are not necessarily the results of 
the recent developments taking place in Syria, 
where Ankara and Washington find themselves 
very much at odds with each other in their respe-
ctive policies.
At the roots of the major controversy between the 
two capitals, lies the very issue of how to treat the 
sub-state armed groups in the region (e.g. YPG 
and PYD that are the mere extensions of the PKK), 
which has been steadily poisoning the bilateral re-
lations over the last quarter of the century. Thus, it 
makes sense to return to our ten-year-old article, 
in the remaining part of this section, in which Dr. 
Oğuzlu and I tried to analyze the causes and the 
consequences of the divergence of approaches 
between Turkey and the United States regarding 
the treatment of sub-state armed groups in the 
region.
Had Turkey and the United States not been sta-
unch allies throughout the Cold War years, they 
would have easily declared each other as “ad-
versary” due to their respective foreign policy 
objectives since the end of the Cold War. More 
specifically, since 9/11, Turkey and the United 
States have found themselves in the middle of an 
undeclared rivalry. Even though the grand stra-
tegic objectives of Turkey and the United States 
seemed to converge regarding the substance, 
there always existed deep divergences between 
the two nations concerning the means and the 
methods of achieving these objectives. 
Hence, the two allies have started to come to 
the point of wrangling more frequently than ever 
in the pursuit of their objectives. It would not be 
wrong to say that the foreign policies of the Ame-
rican administrations were more warmly received 
in Turkey when the United States was 5,000 mi-
les away. Yet, when the United States became a 
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de facto neighbor of Turkey in the aftermath of its invasion of Iraq in 
2003, it has been seen in the Turkish public domain as the “number 
one enemy” and the greatest threat to Turkey’s security, stability as 
well as territorial and political integrity.
Despite a number of initiatives taken by high caliber individuals such 
as former diplomats and statesmen who played active and significant 
roles, on both sides, in the evolution of Turkish-American strategic 
relations, the outlook of the bilateral relations did not seem to be pro-
mising for the years and decades ahead. It should be noted that this 
process included the institutional interventions by the leading think 
tanks and non-governmental organizations, such as trade chambers 
and business unions. 
We thought, this was an anomaly, considering the fact that the two 
nations were among those that would benefit the most by pursuing 
congruent policies with one another regarding the same problem are-
as, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation, which are defined 
by both of them as posing the greatest threats to their national se-
curity. The crisis of confidence in Turkish-American relations, howe-
ver, could not be solely attributed to the leadership in both countries, 
when George W. Bush was the US president. Thus, we believed, the 
expectation that the relations would soon improve with the change of 
government in either or both countries could not be accepted at face 
value. 
The crisis back in the mid-2000s owed its existence too much dee-
per factors, of which the growing rift between the strategic cultures 
of both countries would come first. Therefore, we anticipated in 2008 
that unless the strategic gap is narrowed down, the years ahead 
might be fraught with new crises and dwindling cooperation. Hen-
ce, we argued that the core attributes of the Turkish and American 
strategic cultures in dealing with the challenges and threats to their 
national security, where the essence of the problem seems to lie, 
must be carefully studied. 
This was important, for the dynamics of the Cold War era politics did 
long conceal the strategic differences between Ankara and Washin-
gton. Turkish and American decision-makers have long believed that 
their common threat perceptions would continue to guarantee their 
security cooperation within the context of NATO and elsewhere in 
the world even after the abolishing of the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union. Decades of close and intense cooperation in the military-stra-
tegic domain made the observers believe that both countries were 
subscribed to a common strategic mentality. 
However, the developments that took place in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the bipolar international system, and then the dynamics of 
the post 9/11 era, have made it quite clear that Turkey and the United 
States did not see eye to eye on a number of strategic issues. That 
the United States being the most important actor across the globe 
having a hegemonic agenda, and Turkey a middle-sized power in 
its environment trying to protect itself against the uncertainties of the 
new era, has gradually shaped the strenuous nature of bilateral rela-
tions back then as well. 
In the decades that followed the end of the Cold War, both countries 
have gradually drifted apart in terms of the ways and means of achi-
eving their strategic objectives despite their high degree of congru-
ence in substance. 
Had Turkey and the 
United States not 
been staunch allies 
throughout the Cold 
War years, they 
would have easily 
declared each other 
as “adversary” due 
to their respective 
foreign policy 
objectives since the 
end of the Cold War. 
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To cite a few, both Turkey and the Uni-
ted States had to deal with terrorism 
more frequently and intensively in the 
post-Cold War era than ever before. 
Terrorism has become an inescapable 
problem for both nations due to chan-
ging international security environ-
ment. Notwithstanding the similarity of 
the problem that Turkey and the United 
States faced, it was difficult to argue 
that the degree of cooperation betwe-
en them in dealing with the threat of 
terrorism was at the level that would be 
expected from “staunch allies”. 
On the contrary, falling short of mee-
ting the expectations of each other has 
become a serious source of friction 
and even a bone of contention betwe-
en the two countries. In the same vein, 
both Turkey and the United States 
were concerned with the rise of politi-
cal Islam in the world. Turkey, being a 
secular state by Constitution, has been 
sensitive about the separation of the 
state and the religion in the adminis-
tration of the country. Hence, both Tur-
key and the United States agreed that 
politicization of Islam must be tackled 
somehow. Nevertheless, both countri-
es had deep disagreements on how to 
achieve this goal. 
The growing strategic divergence 
between Turkey and the United States 
became evident when one focused his 
or her attention on the way as to how 
these countries define terrorism and 
the means to deal with it. 
Despite all its horror, the September 
11 attacks did not lead to a wholesale 
Turkish acceptance of the American 
conceptualization of terrorism. To Was-
hington, the new-age terrorism was 
fundamentally different from the old 
conceptualizations in the sense that it 
was more driven by religious ideologi-
es than ever and that the main goal of 
these terrorists was to annihilate their 
opponents. In the eyes of the US de-
cision makers, the new-age terrorism, 
as represented by Al Qaeda, posed 
a grave threat to American way of 
life. What were at stake were the core 
American values. Americans conduc-
ted their struggle against new age ter-
rorism as if they were at war, sugges-
ting that there were only two possible 
outcomes; either total victory or total 
submission. 
In contrast to the United States, Turkey 
viewed terrorism as more of a security 
problem caused by the employment of 
military instruments by a group of terro-
rists driven by what they believed to be 
achievable political goals. To Ankara, 
terrorism still operates in its classical 
understanding and the most important 
challenge in this context came from 
the PKK, which is a classical terrorist 
organization employing brutal and vi-
olent means in order to help bring into 
existence an independent Kurdish sta-
te in Turkey’s southeastern region. 
The aftermath of the US-led war in 
Iraq has made it quite clear that Turkey 
and the United States think differently 
as to how to define as well as to deal 
with the PKK terrorism. Turkey consi-
ders the PKK as an important threat 
posed to its national security and unity 
and thinks that it is entitled to resort to 
every possible legal means available 
to eradicate this threat. In this sense, 
Turkey has grown unhappy with the 
fact the regime change in Iraq has 
provided the PKK with the possibility 
of using northern Iraq as a logistical 
safe haven. 
In the eyes of the Washington adminis-
trations, securing the strategic coope-
ration with the Iraqi Kurds during the 
post-war reconstruction and state-bu-
ilding period in Iraq has long appea-
red to be more important than aiding 
one of the staunchest allies in NATO, 
namely Turkey in its fight against the 
PKK. 
While Washington mainly sees the PKK 
terrorism as Turkey’s domestic prob-
lem and asks Ankara to find a solution 
to it within the framework of improving 
human rights and liberal democracy, 
Ankara argues that the resilience of 
the PKK terrorism is very much related 
to the political dynamics in northern 
Iraq. Moreover, Ankara views the poli-
ticization of the PKK terrorism through 
skeptical eyes and accuses the United 
States of turning a blind eye to Turkey’s 
sensitivities.
The aftermath of 
the US-led war in 
Iraq has made it 
quite clear that 
Turkey and the 
United States 
think differently 
as to how to 
define as well as 
to deal with the 
PKK terrorism. 
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While Washington approaches the PKK issue from an ins-
trumental and tactical point of view, the PKK terrorism touc-
hes the very core of Turkey’s security interests. Furthermore, 
while Turkey defines the Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization 
and helps the United States win its war in Afghanistan, An-
kara does at the same time shy away from defining terrorism 
in reference to religion. To Ankara, the attempts at defining 
terrorism in religious terms, by making reference to Islam in 
particular, does not only breach the teachings of Islam but 
also carries the risk of endangering Turkey’s secular identity.
What Now? Déjà Vu All Over Again
The above section demonstrates quite clearly that not much 
has changed in the positive direction, if not gotten even wor-
se, due to a series of structural reasons that do not allow one 
to be optimistic about whether the once-staunch allies can 
overcome their much-troubled relations any time soon.
What is happening now, ten years later, is simply the “new 
wine in old bottles” or “déjà vu all over again” situation. To 
better understand what is meant by these phrases, it suffi-
ces to replace in the above section, PKK with YPG, and Al-
Qaeda with ISIS, wherever they appear in the text, then read 
again the same paragraphs with the “new” actors, to ack-
nowledge their role today in the “old” strategy of the United 
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a terrorist 
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helps the United 
States win its war 
in Afghanistan, 
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at the same 







An Iraqi soldier holds US and Iraq flags as around
The Strategist - 2018/1
17
One might easily see that the causes and the 
consequences of deep divergences in the 
approaches of Turkey and the United States 
as to how to treat the sub-state armed groups 
in the region that we have discussed in our 
2008 article remain almost exactly the same 
as the present situation.
This, unfortunately, tells us that whether it was 
George W. Bush or Barack H. Obama in the 
past, or Donald J. Trump today, or someone 
else in the White House in the near future, Tur-
kish policymakers will continue to experience 
serious difficulties in having their NATO ally on 
their side in their fight against terrorism and 
this will be the greatest hurdle in the Turkish-
American relations to overcome.
